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How to Write a Research Paper
Writing a research paper is a bit more difficult that a standard high school essay. You need to site sources, use academic data and show scientific examples. Before beginning, you’ll need guidelines for how to write a research paper.
Start the Research Process
Before you begin writing the research paper, you must do your research. It is important that you understand the subject matter, formulate the ideas of your paper, create your thesis statement and learn how to speak about your given topic in an authoritative manner. You’ll be looking through online databases, encyclopedias, almanacs, periodicals, books, newspapers, government publications, reports, guides and scholarly resources. Take notes as you discover new information about your given topic. Also keep track of the references you use so you can build your bibliography later and cite your resources.
Develop Your Thesis Statement
When organizing your research paper, the thesis statement is where you explain to your readers what they can expect, present your claims, answer any questions that you were asked or explain your interpretation of the subject matter you’re researching. Therefore, the thesis statement must be strong and easy to understand. Your thesis statement must also be precise. It should answer the question you were assigned, and there should be an opportunity for your position to be opposed or disputed. The body of your manuscript should support your thesis, and it should be more than a generic fact.
Create an Outline
Many professors require outlines during the research paper writing process. You’ll find that they want outlines set up with a title page, abstract, introduction, research paper body and reference section. The title page is typically made up of the student’s name, the name of the college, the name of the class and the date of the paper. The abstract is a summary of the paper. An introduction typically consists of one or two pages and comments on the subject matter of the research paper. In the body of the research paper, you’ll be breaking it down into materials and methods, results and discussions. Your references are in your bibliography. Use a research paper example to help you with your outline if necessary.
Organize Your Notes
When writing your first draft, you’re going to have to work on organizing your notes first. During this process, you’ll be deciding which references you’ll be putting in your bibliography and which will work best as in-text citations. You’ll be working on this more as you develop your working drafts and look at more white paper examples to help guide you through the process.
Write Your Final Draft
After you’ve written a first and second draft and received corrections from your professor, it’s time to write your final copy. By now, you should have seen an example of a research paper layout and know how to put your paper together. You’ll have your title page, abstract, introduction, thesis statement, in-text citations, footnotes and bibliography complete. Be sure to check with your professor to ensure if you’re writing in APA style, or if you’re using another style guide.
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Heavy Traffic: International Migration in an Era of Globalization
At the start of the new millennium, some 150 million people, or 2.5 percent of the world’s population, live outside their country of birth. That number has doubled since 1965. With poverty, political repression, human rights abuses, and conflict pushing more and more people out of their home countries while economic opportunities, political freedom, physical safety, and security pull both highly skilled and unskilled workers into new lands, the pace of international migration is unlikely to slow any time soon.
Few countries remain untouched by migration. Nations as varied as Haiti, India, and the former Yugoslavia feed international flows. The United States receives by far the most international migrants, but migrants also pour into Germany, France, Canada, Saudia Arabia, and Iran. Some countries, such as Mexico, send emigrants to other lands, but also receive immigrants?both those planning to settle and those on their way elsewhere.
Institutions and laws for achieving cooperation among receiving, source, and transit countries are in their infancy. The World Trade Organization oversees the movement of goods worldwide and the International Monetary Fund monitors the global movement of capital, but no comparable institution regulates the movements of people. Nor does a common understanding exist among states, or experts for that matter, as to the costs and benefits of freer or more restrictive immigration policies.
The surge in international migration, though, is prompting states everywhere to recognize the need for greater harmonization of policies and approaches. Bilateral discussions of migration issues?between the United States and Mexico, for example, over an expanded guestworker program and amnesty for unauthorized Mexican workers?have become more commonplace. During the past decade, regional groups have been set up in the Americas, Europe, East Asia, Africa, and elsewhere to allow receiving, source, and transit countries to address issues of mutual concern.
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Economic, geopolitical, and demographic trends reinforce the need to consolidate these regional institutions and begin to develop a global regime for managing migration.
Susan F. Martin
Economic trends influence migration patterns in many ways. Multinational corporations, for example, press governments to ease movements of executives, managers, and other key personnel from one country to another. When labor shortages appear, whether in information technology or seasonal agriculture, companies also seek to import foreign workers to fill jobs. Although the rules for admitting foreign workers are largely governed by national legislation, regional and international trade regimes such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade in Services include provisions for admitting foreign executives, managers, and professionals. Under NAFTA, for example, U.S., Canadian, and Mexican (as of 2004) professionals in designated occupations may work in the other NAFTA countries without regard to numerical limits imposed on other foreign nationals.
The growth in global trade and investment also affects source countries. Economic development has long been regarded as the best long-term solution to emigration pressures arising from the lack of economic opportunities in developing countries. Almost uniformly, however, experts caution that emigration pressures are likely to remain and, possibly, increase before the long-term benefits accrue. Wayne Cornelius and Philip Martin postulate that as developing countries’ incomes begin to rise and opportunities to leave home increase, emigration first increases and declines only later as wage differentials between emigration and immigration countries fall. Italy and Korea, in moving from emigration to immigration countries, give credence to that theory.
Geopolitical changes since the Cold War era offer both opportunities and challenges for managing international migration, particularly refugee movements. During the Cold War, the United States and other Western countries saw refugee policy as an instrument of foreign policy. The Cold War made it all but impossible to address the roots of refugee movements, which often resulted from surrogate conflicts in Southeast Asia, Central America, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Few refugees were able or willing to return to lands still dominated by conflict or Communism. With the end of the Cold War, new opportunities to return emerged as decades-old conflicts came to an end. Democratization and increased respect for human rights took hold in many countries, as witnessed in the formerly Communist countries of East Europe, making repatriation a reality for millions of refugees who had been displaced for years.
At the same time, rabid nationalism fueled new conflicts that have led to massive displacement in places such as the former Yugoslavia and the Great Lakes region of Africa. When the displacements spilled over to other countries, or became humanitarian crises that threatened the lives of millions, governments proved willing to intervene?even with military force?on behalf of victims. Faced with crises in northern Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and east Timor, classic notions of sovereignty that would once have precluded such intervention came under considerable pressure. On the positive side, people who once would have had to cross international borders to find aid could now find it at home. On the negative side, however, the so-called safe zones established in Bosnia, Iraq, and elsewhere often proved far from secure, leaving internal refugees more vulnerable than those able to cross into neighboring countries.
Demographic trends also reinforce arguments for a global regime to manage migration. Worldwide, fertility rates are falling, although developing countries continue to see rapid population growth. In most industrialized countries, fertility levels are well below replacement rates. In Europe, the average number of children born per woman is 1.4; Italy’s fertility rate is 1.2. Countries with declining fertility face the likelihood of a fall in total population, leading some demographers to see a looming population implosion. Such nations can also expect an aging population, with fewer working-age people for each older person. Although immigration will not solve the problem, it will help ease labor shortages and redress somewhat the aging of the society.
Demographic trends also help explain emigration pressures in Africa, Latin America, and some parts of Asia, where fertility rates are high. Rapidly growing societies often cannot generate enough jobs to keep pace with new entries into the labor force. Growth may also cause environmental degradation, particularly when land use policies do not protect fragile ecosystems. Natural disasters also wreak havoc on densely populated areas in poor countries. Recent hurricanes in Honduras and Nicaragua and earthquakes in El Salvador and India displaced huge numbers of people from ravaged homes and communities.
New Responses
In 1997, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed the possibility of convening a conference on international migration and development. Upon consulting with UN member governments, he found insufficient consensus about what such a conference could accomplish and reported: “The disparate experiences of countries or subregions with regard to international migration suggest that, if practical solutions are to be found, they are likely to arise from the consideration of the particular situation of groups of countries sharing similar positions or concerns with the global international migration systemÉ. In the light of this, it may be expedient to pursue regional or subregional approaches whenever possible.”
Since 1997, regional processes have matured. Perhaps most developed is the Regional Migration Conference, the so-called Puebla Group, which brings together all the countries of Central and North America for regular dialogue on migration issues, including an annual session at the vice-ministerial level. The Puebla Group’s Plan of Action calls for cooperation in exchanging information on migration policy, exploring links between development and migration, combating migrant trafficking, returning extra-regional migrants, and ensuring full respect for the human rights of migrants, as well as reintegrating repatriated migrants, equipping and modernizing immigration control systems, and training officials in migration policy and procedures. Discussions have led law enforcement officials of the United States, Mexico, and several Central American countries to cooperate in arresting and prosecuting members of large-scale smuggling and trafficking operations that move migrants illegally across borders and then force them to work in prostitution, sweatshops, and other exploitive activities.
Similar regional groups are working in East and Southeast Asia. The “Manila Process” focuses on unauthorized migration and trafficking in East and Southeast Asia. Since 1996, it has brought together each year 17 countries for regular exchange of information. The Asia-Pacific Consultations include governments in Asia and Oceania and focus on a broad range of population movements in the region. Both ongoing dialogues were strengthened by a 1999 International Symposium on Migration hosted by the Royal Thai government. In the resulting Bangkok Declaration on Irregular Migration, 19 Asian countries agreed to cooperate to combat smuggling and trafficking.
Other such groups are in the making in the Southern Cone of South America, in western and southern Africa, and in the Mediterranean. The intent is to bring together the governments of all countries involved in migration, whether origin, transit, or receiving. At present, the groups are forums for exchanging information and perspectives, although the more developed ones, such as the Puebla Group, are leading to joint action as well. Given the lack of sharedinformation or consensus about migration policies and practices, the discussion stage is a necessary first step in developing the capacity for joint efforts.
Steps Toward a Global Regime
Will these regional processes lead to a global migration regime? It is too early to know. Three issues must first be addressed. First, states must reach a consensus that harmonizing policies will make migration more orderly, safe, and manageable. And in fact signs exist of growing convergence among regional groups in setting out an agenda for harmonization. Many items on regional agendas relate to unauthorized migration?and how best to deter it, consistent with respect for the rule of law and the human rights of migrants. Although source and destination countries may differ still about what causes unauthorized migration, agreement is growing on some approaches to it?for example, that curbing alien smuggling and trafficking (a global enterprise that nets an estimated $7?10 billion a year) requires international cooperation.
Other issues arise in addressing forced migration. How, for example, should states protect people fleeing repression and conflict? When conflicts end and migrants no longer need protection, when and how should they be required to return? The growing use of temporary protection, as in the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, has led European Union member states to place a high priority on harmonizing temporary protection policies and mechanisms for burden sharing. At the same time, the Puebla Group has focused on temporary protection of victims of natural disasters in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch.
More recently, issues involving legal admissions have appeared on regional agendas. When and to whom should visa restrictions apply? Under what circumstances should family reunification be guaranteed? Who should be eligible for work and residence permits? What rights should accrue to those legally admitted for work or family purposes? Answers to these questions will take time because states still differ widely in their attitudes and policies toward legal immigration. But signs of change can be seen even here. The European Union has led the way, with free movement of labor a long-held principle for its own nationals. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty takes the EU the next step, mandating a common immigration policy for participating states.
Second, a global migration regime will require standards, policies, and new legal frameworks. A legal framework already exists for refugee movements, with most countries now signatories to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Most important, signatories agree that they will not return (refoule) persons to countries where they have a well-founded fear of persecution. International agreements also apply to the rights of migrant workers, but few states ratified the 1990 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, showing that they were unwilling to take on a comprehensive set of obligations toward migrant workers and their families. No body of international law or policy governs responses to other forms of international migration. But with growing economic integration, global trade agreements may become vehicles for formulating such policies. Ongoing negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services involve new agreements?under the rubric of the “movement of natural persons”?to ease the admission of executives, managers, and professionals providing services.
The third issue to be settled before a global migration regime can come into being is organizational responsibilities. At the heart of the refugee regime is the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, whose mandate dates back to 1950. No comparable institution exists for other migration matters. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), a Geneva-based intergovernmental body, with 86 member states and 41 observer states, comes closest. Since its founding in1951 to help resettle refugees and displaced persons from World War II and the Cold War, IOM has taken on a broad set of responsibilities, including counter-trafficking programs, migrant health and medical services, technical assistance and capacity building, and assisted return programs. In particular, it serves as the secretariat for some of the regional processes discussing international migration. IOM is not a part of the UN system (although it cooperates with UN agencies), and it represents far fewer states. To become the focal point of a new migration regime, it would need substantial new resources and government support, particularly in helping governments formulate new global migration policies. Its governing board, composed of government representatives, has already requested and provided funds to IOM to strengthen its capacity to advise governments on best practices in migration management. Both source and destination countries recognize the need for improved responses, and IOM’s broad membership helps it devise policies that balance varied governmental interests.
A Multilateral Approach
In an increasingly interconnected world, governments are unlikely to be able to solve the many problems posed by international migration through unilateral approaches only. Source, receiving, and transit countries must all cooperate to manage international migration.
Reaching agreement will be relatively straightforward when countries share similar interests and problems?for example, in combating the most exploitive type of human trafficking. Often, however, interests will diverge. Source countries such as Mexico will press for easier access to the labor markets of wealthier countries. Receiving countries such as the United States will face public concerns about seemingly uncontrolled movements into their territories. Agreement will be difficult. Still, these issues will not go away just because different countries see them differently. Sheer necessity is likely to move governments toward a global migration regime.
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Journal of International Migration and Integration
The Journal of International Migration and Integration (JIMI) is a multidisciplinary peer-reviewed scholarly journal that publishes original research papers and policy discussions that enhance the understanding of immigration, settlement and integration and that contribute to policy development.
The Journal consistently covers an array of subject areas including labor market integration; refugee status in various nations; adaptation strategies of immigrants in industrialized settings; racial and gender variations in migration; the role of social work in the integration of new citizens; and retention of ethnic and older national identities in new environments. These are issues of concern throughout the world. The journal looks at the social world with a fresh vision enhanced by the basic and applied social sciences.
JIMI presents papers based on original research, critical policy debates and comparative analyses. JIMI no longer publishes book reviews.
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- Presents papers based on original research, critical policy debate and comparative analyses
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International migration: key findings from the u.s., europe and the world.
Millions of people have migrated from their homes to other countries in recent years. Some migrants have moved voluntarily, seeking economic opportunities. Others have been forced from their homes by political turmoil, persecution or war and have left their countries to seek asylum elsewhere.
To mark International Migrants Day this Sunday, here are our key findings about international migration trends.
How many international migrants are there? Where are they from? Where do they live?
If all of the world’s international migrants (people living in a country that is different from their country or territory of birth) lived in a single country, it would be the world’s fifth largest, with around 244 million people. Overall, international migrants make up 3.3% of the world’s population today.
However, international migrants do not live in one country. Instead, they are dispersed across the world, with most having moved from middle-income to high-income countries . Top origins of international migrants include India (15.6 million), Mexico (12.3 million), Russia (10.6 million), China (9.5 million) and Bangladesh (7.2 million).
Among destination countries, the U.S. has more international migrants than any other country . It is home to about one-in-five international migrants (46.6 million). Other top destinations of migrants include Germany (12.0 million), Russia (11.6 million), Saudi Arabia (10.2 million) and the United Kingdom (8.5 million).
But absolute numbers don’t tell the whole migration story. For example, while the U.S. has the most immigrants in the world, only 14% of the country’s population is foreign born . This immigrant share is considerably lower than that in several Persian Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, where three-in-four or more people are international migrants . Moreover, top destination countries like Australia (28% foreign born) and Canada (22% foreign born) have much larger immigrant shares of their total population than the U.S.
Is international migration increasing?
It has increased substantially in terms of absolute numbers, but less so as a share of the world’s current population. The absolute number of international migrants has grown considerably over the past 50 years, from about 79 million in 1960 to nearly 250 million in 2015, a 200% increase. So by population size, there are far more international migrants today.
But the world’s population has also grown during that time, rising nearly 150% from about 3 billion to 7.3 billion. As a result, the share of the world’s population living outside their countries of birth has increased some during the past 50 or so years. In 1960, 2.6% of the world’s population did not live in their birth countries. In 2015, that share was 3.3%. As a share of the world’s population, the 0.7-percentage-point increase in the world’s migrant share is hardly insignificant. Nonetheless, the vast majority (nearly 97%) of the world’s population has not moved across international borders.
What have been some of the major pathways for international migration?
For example, the Mexico-U.S. migration corridor has been one of the world’s most heavily traveled in recent decades. Today, about 12 million people born in Mexico are living in the U.S. This number has declined in recent years as net flows have reversed , with more Mexican immigrants leaving the U.S. than entering it. Also, the number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the U.S. has declined by 1 million between 2007 and 2014, even as the total number of unauthorized immigrants has stabilized at about 11.1 million.
While migration of Mexicans to the U.S. has been decreasing, Mexico is an important transit country for other U.S.-bound Latin Americans. U.S. border apprehensions of families and unaccompanied children have more than doubled between fiscal years 2015 and 2016, with most coming from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. A rising number of Cubans have also entered the U.S. via Mexico.
As of 2015, nearly 3.5 million Indians lived in the UAE, the world’s second-largest migration corridor. Unlike the Mexico-U.S. corridor, the number of Indians living in the UAE and other Persian Gulf countries has increased substantially during the past decade, from 2 million in 1990 to more than 8 million in 2015. Most have migrated for economic opportunities in these oil-rich countries.
The Middle East has the fastest-growing migrant population. When counting both international migrants and displaced migrants within their own countries (internally displaced persons), the number of migrants in the Middle East doubled during the past decade, from 25 million in 2005 to 54 million in 2015.
How many among the world’s migrants are refugees? Are they increasing in number?
Refugees are a subset of displaced persons worldwide. The latest UN estimates suggest that more than 60 million, or nearly 1 in 100 people worldwide , are forcibly displaced from their homes, the highest number and share of the world’s population since World War II. As of 2015, nearly two-thirds (63%) of the world’s displaced population still lived in their birth countries.
The Syrian conflict has dramatically increased the number of displaced people since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011. About one-fifth of the world’s displaced, or 12.5 million , were born in Syria. Colombia, meanwhile, has more displaced people than any other country: nearly 7 million, most of whom are internally displaced because of the country’s decades-long conflict.
How many refugees are entering Europe and the U.S.?
In fiscal 2016, which ended Sept. 30, the U.S. resettled nearly 85,000 refugees within its borders, the most since 1999. As in Europe, there has been much discussion in the U.S. about which refugees should be admitted, both in terms of their origins and their religious affiliations. The U.S. has seen a shift in the origins of refugees , with most in recent years coming from Asia, Africa and the Middle East. During the 1990s, most were from Europe. At the same time, a record number of U.S. refugees in fiscal 2016 were Muslim , with most coming from Syria and Somalia . Refugees are resettled all over the U.S., but more than half (54%) were resettled in just 10 states .
In what ways does international migration impact countries?
As immigrants make money, they send some back to relatives in their home countries. These remittances have grown to nearly $600 billion worldwide in 2015. For some countries, remittances are an economic lifeline. For example, about a quarter or more of Central Asian countries’ gross domestic product is tied to remittances.
Migrants also alter the demographics of their destination countries. Between 1965 and 2015, 59 million people immigrated to the U.S. Factoring in their children and their children’s children, the population of the U.S. is 72 million higher than it would have been had this level of immigration not occurred. In the same way, immigration is expected to be a major contributor to the growth of the U.S. population for the next 50 years, increasing the total number of people to a projected 441 million. If no additional immigrants were to enter the U.S. from 2015 forward, the country’s population would be about 338 million in 2065 – about the same as it is today.
More recently, several European countries have seen their immigrant shares jump by 1 percentage point in less than a year as hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries entered the Continent in 2015. As a point of comparison, the immigrant share of the U.S. population increased by about 1 percentage point over a decade , rising from 13% in 2005 to about 14% in 2015 .
There can also be an impact on migrants’ countries of origin when they cross international borders, especially if they move in large numbers. In 2015, nine countries had 20% or more of their birth populations living in a different country. Large-scale emigration can have significant impacts on the demographics of nations. For example, Albania has seen many of its young adults leave for opportunities elsewhere. By comparison, emigration has been more common among highly educated groups in Trinidad and Tobago. In some instances, out-migration among particular groups can exacerbate population aging and leave significant skill gaps within these source countries.
How do Americans and Europeans view immigrants?
Immigration was a top issue in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, and the divide between Democrats and Republicans on immigration issues has been stark. In another survey by the Center conducted in early August, nearly eight-in-ten voters who supported President-elect Donald Trump favored building a wall along the U.S.-Mexican border , while only one-in-ten voters who supported Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton favored it. Nonetheless, the majority (60%) of Trump supporters said that undocumented immigrants should be allowed to stay in the country provided they met certain requirements. By comparison, nearly all (95%) of Clinton supporters said the same.
In Europe, the recent surge of refugees has made some Europeans wary of the immigration situation in their countries. In eight of 10 European nations surveyed in spring, half or more adults in those countries said incoming refugees increased the likelihood of terrorism in their countries. Similarly, half or more adults in five of the 10 countries surveyed said that refugees would have a negative economic impact on their countries , taking jobs and social benefits.
As the influx of different races, ethnic groups and nationalities changes the face of Europe, few Europeans say that growing diversity makes their country a better place to live. In none of the 10 nations surveyed did a majority see increasing diversity as a positive. The same survey found Europeans sharply divided about whether refugees leaving Iraq and Syria were a major threat to their countries.
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Empirical study article, international migration and development: a dyadic analysis of the americas, 1970–2010.
- 1 Department of Sociology, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States
- 2 Department of Sociology, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States
This paper assesses the migration-development nexus from a new, relational perspective, providing a closer test of existing theories of cross-national dynamics, including migration and development. Using bilateral data, we assess the relationship between migration (im)balances and wage differentials between pairs of countries in the Americas, from 1970 to 2010. The analysis reveals a positive feedback between international migration and cross-national inequalities. Migration responds strongly to wage gaps, which motivate more uni-directional, or imbalanced migration flows in country-pairs. This relationship is particularly strong in contiguous countries. Similarly, wage gaps respond to migration imbalances, which increase per capita income differences in country-pairs, although the effect of migration on wage differentials is smaller than the effect of wage differentials on migration. Together, the results suggest that the migration-development nexus is characterized by a strong internal momentum.
Introduction
Migration is increasingly touted by key players in the policy realm as a means of addressing inequalities through “development.” As cross-national inequalities persist, questions are (re-) emerging about the relationship between migration, development, and inequality. How does immigration affect development outcomes in sending and receiving countries? Further, how do relative changes in cross-national inequalities affect the magnitude and timing of migration between countries? More broadly, how does international migration compare in magnitude to other, known global drivers of inequalities, including trade, foreign direct investment, and international political relations?
We assess these questions by taking a different approach, theoretically and methodologically. We integrate insights from neoclassical economics into a political-economic analytical framework that views both cross-national inequalities and international migration as expressions of an uneven distribution of power across countries situated within a single, worldwide economic division of labor ( Portes, 1978 ; Sassen, 1988 ). We employ dyadic analysis ( Krackhardt, 1988 ), which utilizes a dataset constructed with country-pairs rather than individual countries, using existing comprehensive cross-national, longitudinal data. Our approach offers a closer test of political-economic theory, which is oriented around relational explanations of cross-national dynamics, including migration and development. To begin, we construct a theoretical framework from neoclassical economic theory and political-economic theory, two approaches that have often been cast, for good reason, as counter-explanations of the migration-development nexus. As will be shown, however, these two perspectives are not entirely antithetical to one another on the issue of wage differentials, or gaps, which is the most important factor posited to shape migration patterns in the world division of labor.
Conceptual Framework
Neoclassical economic theory takes as its point of departure the assumption that migrants are rational, utility-maximizing individuals who make the decision to move on the basis of cost-benefit considerations, the primary consideration being the expected wage gains from moving into the labor market in a destination country where labor is remunerated at a relatively higher level ( Lewis, 1954 ; Lee, 1966 ). At the macro-level, international wage differentials are the key explanation of international migration ( Thomas, 1973 ). International wage differentials are an outcome of differences in the relative supply of and demand for labor: wages will be lower in countries in which the supply of labor exceeds the demand for labor, and higher in countries in which the supply of labor is insufficient to meet demand. At the micro-level, migrants are posited to act rationally in exploiting differentials in international wage levels. Migrants are “pushed” by relatively lower wages in the origin country and “pulled” to relatively higher wages in the destination country. International migration should therefore reduce wage differentials between countries, moving countries closer to an equilibrium level that reflects only the costs of moving, and ultimately minimizing much of the economic incentive to move.
Although this perspective remains the conventional framework, it is increasingly criticized for its inability to account for empirical regularities. Most importantly, wage differentials have been shown to be only a weak explanation of international migration. Despite widening differences in cross-country wage levels, the propensity to send migrants varies dramatically across countries and the stock of international migrants has remained relatively stable at three per cent of world population since the 1960s. Moreover, wages across countries have not come close to converging, despite the fact that there are more international migrants today in absolute numbers (232 million) than at any time in modern history ( United Nations, 2013 ).
The limitations of the conventional perspective opened intellectual space for alternative perspectives, including political-economic approaches. In contrast to the neoclassical economics concept of rational, utility-maximizing migrants, political economy approaches focus on the structures that condition and constrain individual action. Migration is part of a system: individuals may indeed migrate on the basis of cost-benefit considerations, but both the costs and benefits of movement are structured by an historical context of unequal exchange in a hierarchical international division of labor. By definition, international migration involves the transgression of national boundaries. But for those working from a political economy perspective, migration is not only movement across national boundaries; it is more importantly movement within an integrated political-economic system ( Portes, 1978 ; Sassen-Koob, 1978 , 1981 ; Portes and Walton, 1981 ; Delgado Wise, 2006 ; Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2007 , 2008 ; Delgado Wise and Cypher, 2007 ).
Placing international migration in this broader, world-historical context addresses a key limitation in the conventional, push-pull framework: that cross-country wage differentials are not strong explanations of international migrations. By expanding the scope of inquiry from national to world-scale processes, the political economy perspective opens up for examination the relationship between trans-national political-economic processes and international migration ( Petras, 1980 ; Morawska, 1990 ; Hamilton and Chinchilla, 1991 , 1996 ; Fernandez-Kelly and Massey, 2007 ). This is an important analytical advance because these global processes ultimately create the context for individual-level decision-making: “It is within the context of extensive social and economic penetration of peripheral societies by the institutions of advanced capitalism that individual cost-benefit calculations make sense” ( Portes, 2007 , p. 77). In this sense: “Migrants can be viewed as stepping or falling into a migratory flow, rather than initiating or constituting such a flow through their individual decisions and actions” ( Sassen-Koob, 1978 , p. 515).
By focusing almost exclusively on wage differentials, the conventional perspective also de-politicizes the world political-economic context in which migrants make decisions. In doing so, it misses key, structural relations that motivate and sustain international migration. Here, the concept of unequal exchange is paramount. Over time, unequal exchange between core and non-core zones produces uneven development across zones in the world-economy. International migration is a consequence of this uneven development, expressed as wage differentials: if not for (widening) cross-national income disparities, international migration would not exist. In this sense, both the conventional approach and the political economy perspective view wage differentials as a necessary cause of international migration.
Migration as a Cause of Wage Differentials and Unequal Exchange
Although both approaches view wage differentials as motivations for migration, these differentials become an explanandum in the political economy approach; they are foregrounded and explained, whereas they remain exogenous to the conventional approach.
Political economists contend that international migration is not only an outcome of unequal exchange, it is also cause of unequal exchange, reproducing uneven development in the world political economy. Burawoy (1976) provides one of the earliest discussions. International migration is a labor supply system. Migrants are a labor force, and like all labor forces, it must be maintained and renewed, or reproduced. What differentiates an international labor supply system from a domestic one, however, is that the process of reproduction (that is, of maintenance and renewal) occurs across national boundaries, so that different institutions are responsible for organizing, and bearing the costs of, the reproduction of the labor force. This opens up the possibility that the benefits of migrant labor may not accrue to the institutions bearing the costs of reproducing the migrant labor system. For example, in the case of Mexican emigration to the United States, the costs of educating, training and reproducing the labor force are borne largely by the Mexican state and economy, but the benefits of capital accumulation derived from their application to production processes are reaped mainly by the United States:
“Thus, for Mexican migrants, processes of renewal are organized under the Mexican state in the Mexican economy, and those of maintenance in the United States…the activities of maintenance and renewal are separated…In other words, a proportion of the costs of renewal is externalized to an alternate economy and/or state” ( Burawoy, 1976 : 1052-1053).
Thus, international migration is a form of unequal exchange, reproducing uneven development: “The significance of migrant labor lies in the separation of the processes of maintenance and renewal, so that renewal takes place where living standards are low and maintenance takes place within easy access of employment” ( Burawoy, 1976 , p. 1082). By capitalizing on uneven levels of wage remuneration across countries, international migration then tends to exacerbate those differences, leaving the origin country with sunk costs associated with education, training, and reproducing labor while enhancing capital accumulation in the destination country: “The very sale of labor power by an underdeveloped country…to an economically advanced nation serves only to reinforce the relations of economic subjugation and domination” ( Burawoy, 1976 , p. 1068).
Understanding international migration as a cross-national labor supply system means understanding migration as an unequal exchange between nation-states within a hierarchical world political economy and not as isolated movements across autonomous, self-contained nation-states ( Sassen, 1988 , 2001 ). That is, international migration is inherently relational —it is an exchange between two countries. From the political economy perspective, this exchange is both an outcome of uneven development (expressed as wage differentials) and a cause of uneven development between two countries.
Migration and Structural Imbalances
As an exchange, international migration is closely associated with structural imbalances within the origin and destination countries. Power differences between origin and destination countries, expressed as per capita income differentials, cannot be ignored. International migration is both an outcome of cross-national power differentials and is a contributor to them.
From the political economy perspective, international migration is initiated as higher-income countries expand markets into, or penetrate, lower-income countries. Market expansion through trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) restructures social, political, economic, and cultural institutions, mobilizing segments of the population into migration streams ( Sassen, 1988 ), some of which are directed toward domestic urban areas and some of which spills over across national boundaries: “Sustained labor migration requires the penetration of the political and economic institutions of the dominant unit…into the subordinate one…(creating) internal imbalances between sectors and institutions in the subordinated unit” ( Portes and Walton, 1981 , p. 31).
Integration between higher and lower-income countries creates bi-national markets for labor and capital that motivate migration. As institutions within the lower-income country are restructured to fit into the bi-national, and inter-national, division of labor, new domestic classes emerge with closer ties to foreign capital, and consumption habits, and values and norms are reoriented toward the higher-income country. In particular, the balance between labor and capital within the origin and destination countries changes. On the labor-supply side (in the origin country), newly mobile populations emerge as labor is “freed up” from traditional sectors such as agriculture. As a result, international migrations do not originate “spontaneously” from individual cost-benefit analyses. They are produced by political-economic processes that imbalance the lower-income society in relation to the higher-income country “Structural imbalances between newer and older elements eventually produce migratory pressures” ( Portes and Walton, 1981 , p. 32). The concept of structural imbalancing is supported with case studies that range from South African manual labor migrations to the emigration of Argentine doctors, providing empirical evidence that “…common forces underlie superficially different movements” ( Portes and Walton, 1981 , p. 30).
On the labor-demand side (destination country), supply-side shocks induce new demands for lower-wage labor that support further capital accumulation in the higher-income country and exacerbate wage differentials between the origin and destination country. International migration is thus motivated by this “pull”-effect of restructuring while promoting further economic restructuring in the higher-income country ( Piore, 1979 ). Here, the value of a political-economic perspective is particularly apparent, as these two dynamics—on the supply and demand side—are viewed as flip-sides of a single bi-national, or international, process: the restructuring of capital accumulation beginning in the 1960s. Deindustrialization in the core and the restructuring of core economies into service-oriented economies increased demand for both high-wage and low-wage service sector jobs, polarizing occupational and income distributions and increasing the demand for immigrant labor ( Piore, 1979 ). Motivated by the need to sustain profitability in the face of rising wages in the core, corporations in high-income countries invest in production abroad, expanding markets, and this investment ultimately mobilizes segments of lower-income countries into migration streams that are directed back toward the high-income country ( Sassen, 1988 ).
Political economy approaches thus explicitly relate wage differentials to international migration in a reciprocal relationship. Migration is an exchange. On the one hand, wage differentials express inequalities in power between two countries. Higher-income countries are able to re-structure institutions in lower-income countries, leading to structural imbalances that give rise to international migration. On the other hand, international migration promotes further structural imbalances in both origin and destination, exacerbating wage differentials between high and lower-income countries.
Thus, from the political economy perspective, there are not one, but two indicators of unequal exchange—income differentials and migration differentials— and they are related . Income differentials should motivate international migration between the two countries, resulting in a migration imbalance —a larger flow of immigrants moving in one direction—between the two countries. Further, this migration imbalance should exacerbate wage differentials between the two countries, as it would facilitate restructuring within the higher-income country.
We test these relationships using bilateral data on country-pairs. In doing so, we extend the concept of structural imbalancing beyond a particular country to bi-national contexts. Here, structural imbalancing is relational—it occurs within the context of exchanges between countries, of which migration is one such key exchange. This approach provides a closer test of political economy frameworks, as it is able to assess relations between origin and destination countries simultaneously. We move beyond the country characteristics approach to migration and development and recast this relationship more clearly in a dyadic, relational perspective.
As a further extension, we assess the role of geography as a moderating factor. Although it has diversified geographically, international migration remains more common between countries that are contiguous, especially in the Global South ( Ratha and William, 2007 ). Migration is both a cause and a consequence of labor markets that form across national boundaries. For example, Sanderson (2014) found that movements of capital and labor between Mexico and the U.S. created a bi-national labor market linking the two countries. Capital investments between the two countries created “channels” for migration that facilitated movement along sectoral-industrial lines between the two countries. The outcome of capital and labor movements between the two country was effectively a bi-national market for labor. We therefore explore the role of labor market contiguity as a possible moderating factor on the migration-development nexus.
Data and Methods
Dyadic analysis.
This study utilizes a dyadic analytic model to assess the relationships between migration and development, rather than the typical individual country attributional analytic structure. Dyadic analysis can more rigorously test existing theory, which posits that relations between particular countries shape development dynamics ( Krackhardt, 1988 ; William, 2001 ).
Since the use of dyadic analysis in this type of research is relatively new, it may be useful to provide some background on this methodology. The use of dyads is an old concept, originating in psychology nearly a century ago with the study of pairs of individuals as the unit of analysis ( Picard, 1920 ). It first appears in the sociological literature in the early 1940s ( Becker and Useem, 1942 ), again with pairs of individuals as dyads.
The field of international relations has employed this methodology in studies of between-country relationships extensively (see Erikson et al., 2017 ). However, the use of dyads in the sociological literature with country-pairs as the unit of analysis emerged only recently (see, for example, Bonikowski, 2010 ), and the use of dyadic analysis in the study of migration is even more recent ( Blodgett and Leblang, 2015 ).
Dyadic Data Structure
Our dyadic data set is considerably more complex than an individual country-based structure. A typical attributional data set for the Americas would have 22 countries, or cases. In our dyadic data structure, the unit of analysis is the country-pair (U.S. Mexico, for example), giving us 462 total country-pairs (22 × 21 = 462). Half of these pairs are redundant (Honduras-Brazil and Brazil-Honduras, for example), leaving 231 independent country-pairs. Since our study is longitudinal, with five time points (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010), the individual case becomes the country-pair-year (i.e., Belize-Columbia-2010). Our final data set contains a total of 1,155 country-pair-year cases (or dyad-year cases; 231 × 5 = 1,155).
Given the longitudinal structure of our analyses, we estimate models using the two most common panel data methods—random effects and fixed effects models—to address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. We use random effects models specifically to assess the influence of geographic contiguity, or a shared border. Because contiguity is a time-constant, unit-specific variable, it is effectively removed from fixed effects analysis, making it only possible to analyze in random effects models.
Data for this study come from several different cross-national data sources. Bilateral international migration stocks and bilateral refugee stocks come from the World Bank 's Global Bilateral Migration Database ( 2014 ). To ensure that migration stocks do not include refugee stocks, we subtract the refugee stocks from migration stocks for each country pair. We use stocks for theoretical and methodological reasons. Theoretically, both political economy and neoclassical economic approaches make arguments about total numbers of immigrants, so we use total numbers, or stocks, of immigrants as our measure of migration, and control for the country's population size in the analyses. Methodologically, bilateral data on migration flows were not available in sufficient numbers for analysis. Additionally, using migrant stocks can be seen as a more conservative approach, because stocks are relatively more stable than flows over time 1 .
Included in our analyses are several control variables used in previous research. GDP per capita data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars and are taken from the World Bank 's World Development Indicators dataset ( 2014 ). Total population, government expenditures per GDP and foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks per GDP are also taken from the WDI dataset. 2 Income inequality data are from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (version 15), which provides comparable GINI indices of net income inequality. International Governmental Organizations (IGO) data and bilateral imports data were produced by the Correlates of War project (version 2.1). We standardize the imports data on GDP for purposes of comparison. In addition, we include two interaction terms of border contiguity * international migration and border contiguity * GDP per capita.
Because we are interested in how differences in magnitudes between countries affect international migration and income differences, we compute difference scores for all of the variables. For example, to determine the “wage gap” between two countries in given year, we use the absolute value of the difference between the GDP per capita of Country A and the GDP per capita of Country B. Similarly, to determine the “migration balance/gap,” we use the absolute value of the difference between the number of international migrants from Country A living in Country B, and the number of international migrants from Country B living in Country A. For example, if there are 8,686 Americans in Argentina in 1970 and 55,325 Argentinians in the U.S., then the migration gap, or balance, for this dyad-year is 46,639. We use the absolute value of this difference so that the measure does not depend on the direction of the difference (i.e., whether the value for Country A is subtracted from the value of Country B, or vice versa). This strategy allows us to more closely test political-economic theory, which is a relational approach focused on the imbalances, or differences the in magnitudes of wages and migration between countries.
Sample sizes are determined by data availability. The reduced models (i.e., models without controls) include all (100%) possible dyads ( n = 231) and 92% of all possible dyad-years ( n = 1,077). Data are only available from 1980 to 2000 for all the variables in the full model, reducing the total number of dyads in the analysis to 209 (91% of all possible dyads) and the number of dyad-years to 354 (31% of all possible dyad-years).
Table 1 presents results from the analysis of migration balances (gaps). Consistent with political economy theory and neoclassical economic theory, wage differentials are positively associated with migration balances. Migration stocks are more imbalanced in country-pairs with larger wage gaps. The effect of wage differentials depends in part, however, on contiguity (Model 3 in Table 1 ). The positive effect of wage differentials is much larger in country-pairs that share a border. The main effect for GDP per capita indicates that for country-pairs that do not share a border, a 10% increase in the wage gap is associated with a 5.2% increase in the migration imbalance (1.10∧0.533 = 1.052). However, for country-pairs that share a border, a 10% increase in the wage gap is associated with a 69.2% increase in the migration imbalance (5.895–0.376 = 5.519; 1.10∧5.519 = 1.692). Thus, as neoclassical economic theory and political economy theories expect, wage differentials give rise to more uni-directional flows of immigrants between countries. Moreover, this effect is much stronger in country-pairs that are contiguous.
Table 1 . Dyadic panel regressions of international migration gaps on GDP per capita gaps.
We also note that both other measures of globalization—trade and FDI—have positive relationships with migration balances. That is, migration becomes more imbalanced as trade gaps and investment (FDI) gaps widen. The coefficient for the difference in within-country inequality is also noteworthy. As the difference in within-country inequality scores increases, migration imbalances increase, too. We note that government expenditures, a measure of state strength, are the only variable negatively associated with migration gaps. We find that migration balances decrease, or become more even, in country-pairs as the difference between state strength increases. Finally, migration gaps are growing over time, as indicated by each of the time trend variables.
Table 2 presents results from the analysis of wage differentials (gaps). The findings lend support to political economic theory. Migration imbalances are associated with higher wage differentials, not lower wage differentials as neoclassical economic theory would expect. Larger migration imbalances in country-pairs are associated with larger wage gaps. This relationship does not depend on contiguity, as the interaction term is not statistically significant. The main effect for international migration indicates that a 10% increase in the migration imbalance (gap) is associated with a 1.3% increase in the wage gap (1.10∧0.135 = 1.0129).
Table 2 . Dyadic panel regressions of GDP per capita gaps on international migration gaps.
Differences in foreign direct investment (FDI) and within-country income inequality also are positively associated with wage gaps. Stated differently, more imbalanced FDI stocks and larger differences in within-country income inequality are associated with larger wage differentials between countries. We also note that the year indicators demonstrate growing wage gaps in the region from 1970 to 2010.
This paper assessed the migration-development nexus from a new, relational perspective, using bilateral data to assess the relationship between migration balances and wage differentials between pairs of countries in the Americas, from 1970 to 2010. The findings have important implications for: our understanding of the links between the migration, development, and inequalities; and theory and policy related to the migration-inequality-development nexus, which now stands as a top priority in the global development agenda among key international organizations.
The most important finding to emerge is the existence of a positive feedback between international migration and cross-national inequalities. In line with neoclassical economic theory and political economic theory, wage differentials motivate international migration, which manifest as migration im balances in country pairs. But, consistent with political-economic theory, international migration imbalances lead to larger wage differentials in country-pairs. Thus, the results suggest a significant internal momentum in the migration-development nexus. Migration responds to cross-national inequalities (wage gaps), and as migrants become more concentrated in higher-income countries, wage gaps increase, which motivates further migration in a positive feedback loop that exacerbates cross-national inequalities.
The strength of the relationship depends on geographic contiguity. Wage gaps are positively associated with migration imbalances regardless of whether countries share a border, but the effect of wage differentials is highly elastic in contiguous counties. If average incomes in a county-pair sharing a border diverge by 1%, the migration balance would become much more uneven, increasing by ~6%. To translate this in to real terms, the wage differential between the U.S. and Mexico in 2010 was $35,835 (absolute value of $43,952–$8,117 in 2000 constant U.S. dollars) and the migration balance was 11,757,661 (absolute value of 740,182–12,497,843). Every 1% increase in the wage gap ($358), is associated with an increase in the migration imbalance of 658,529 persons.
Although there is a positive feedback between wage gaps and migration balances, the two relationships are not proportional, and the result is a more muted feedback than would otherwise be the case. Stated differently, migration responds strongly to wage gaps, but wage gaps are not as responsive to migration. Increasing the migration imbalance by 10% would lead to just a 1.3% increase in the wage gap. It is a significant response, but it is much weaker than the migration response to a change in the wage differential. In this regard, one finding merits more attention in future research. We find that the wage differential-migration balance relationship is much more elastic than the migration balance-wage differential relationship. The difference between the magnitude of the effects is intriguing and is worthy of further exploration.
This study provides a basis for further theoretical integration, as we find evidence to support both neoclassical economic theory and political economy theories. New data available at the bilateral level of analysis should make integration much more feasible in the coming years. It is noted that the U.S.-Mexico relationship is important for understanding migration and development in the western hemisphere. The Mexico-U.S. migration corridor is the largest in the world in terms of the number of migrants moving between these two countries. Future research could expand the scope beyond the Americas in order to examine the generalizability of the findings. It would be worthwhile to assess other regions specifically in order to understand whether the dynamics we have identified in the U.S./North American-based migration system generalize to other world regions. Similarly, there is a real need to incorporate measures of conflict. Data on conflict (internal and international) are readily available. In the Americas, there was insufficient variation to warrant inclusion of conflict data in our models. Moreover, our models remove refugee stocks from the migration stocks variable. However, the role of conflict on the migration-development nexus should be considered in future research examining a wider array of countries and/or different world regions. Finally, the significant impacts we find of income inequality, foreign direct investment, IGOs and trade on the migration/wage nexus all offer fertile directions for future exploration.
Data Availability Statement
Publicly available datasets were analyzed in this study. These data can be found here: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-bilateral-migration-database ; https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-bilateral-migration-database/a .
Author Contributions
MS and JK contributed equally to authorship of the manuscript, including research design, conducting the research, performing the analysis, and writing the manuscript.
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
1. ^ To further explore the relationship between migration balances and wage gaps, the models were re-estimated using international migration densities, or international immigrants per capita, instead of total international migration stocks. We find no evidence of a relationship between migration balances and wage gaps using international migration densities. Results are available upon request.
2. ^ Attributional FDI data are used in these analyses due to a lack of available bilateral FDI data.
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Keywords: migration, development, globalization, inequality, Americas
Citation: Sanderson MR and Kentor JD (2020) International Migration and Development: A Dyadic Analysis of the Americas, 1970–2010. Front. Sociol. 5:15. doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2020.00015
Received: 25 November 2018; Accepted: 21 February 2020; Published: 04 March 2020.
Reviewed by:
Copyright © 2020 Sanderson and Kentor. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
*Correspondence: Matthew R. Sanderson, mattrs@ksu.edu
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